

Diversity and Security: The Effect of In-State Tribal and Racial Diversity on Homicide Rate, Civil Conflict, and Chances of International War-Fighting

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Abstract

The debate about the impact of diversity on nation-states (and other societies) is a long-running one. Many scholars have noted that demographic diversity can bring with it issues such as workplace dis-satisfaction, civic unrest, and occasional serious ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985; Horowitz 2000; Chua 2002; Putnam 2007; Derbyshire 2009). However, others point out that the effects of diversity also include significant plus-side benefits like reduced group-think, reduced bigotry, increased cosmopolitanism, and improved final business and political product (Riggs 1998; Goldsmith 2004; Choi 2009; Payne, McDonald, & Hamm 2013). Perhaps the dominant paradigm in this field has been what some call “managing diversity,” whose advocates argue that diversity can be a plus if steered toward the latter set of outcomes by competent political and business leaders (Goldsmith 2004; Harell & Stolle 2010; Meyer & Brysac 2011). Newly come to the field of intellectual battle, the “alt right” disagrees. Authors writing within this bloc claim that – due to large alleged inequalities between cultures and races (Derbyshire 2009; Kersey 2012) – diversity almost always has a negative effect on several specific variables which measure conflict (Taylor 2011). This paper tests that claim. In it, I examine the effect of three measures of diversity, and of eight other independent variables, on three specific conflict-related DV (homicide rate, civil war, international war-fighting). I hypothesize that racial diversity, ethnic diversity, and population size will have mixed and complex relationships with violence, while income inequality (“economic diversity”), corruption, and population density will have a positive effect on all three forms of violence (i.e., increase them), and that democratization, increasing GDP, increasing HDI, Black majority status, and Islamic majority status will have a negative effect on all three forms of violence. Overall, my results support some of my starting hypotheses and strongly counter the alt-right/anti-diversity position. Black and Islamic majority societies are not more violent than other societies, and were in one model (Homicide Rates) notably less so. Racial diversity had essentially no effect on homicide rates or rates of civil war - the two primary measures it was hypothesized to effect - across my data universe of nation states, and income inequality had far more influence on the measures of violence than any measure of demographic diversity. Ethnic diversity was, as hypothesized, a major predictor of civil war, but it is worth noting that this was almost entirely a diversity of same-race groups speaking different languages. Overall, income inequality and governmental corruption seem to be by far the biggest predictors at least of intra-national violence(s).

1. Introduction and Literatures

Always an interest for political scientists, the effect of intra-state diversity on conflict has assumed increased relevance following the much-discussed recent rise of the alt-right (Abramson 2016; Bokhari and Yiannopolous 2016; Cook 2016; McConnell 2016). Over the years, multiple scholars have noted that increased demographic diversity within a state or smaller organized unit can have negative effects including reduced social trust (Putnam 2007), decreased job satisfaction and organizational communication among employees (Choi 2009), and increased non-violent and violent conflict among citizens (Riggs 1998; Derbyshire 2009). However, others have pointed out that increasing diversity also correlates with such strongly positive outcomes as “cosmopolitanism” and cross-cultural relationships that reduce bigotry (Riggs 1998) and a decrease in group-think and accompanying problems like nepotism (Choi 2009). Perhaps the leading paradigm in business and quantitative political science has been that of “managing diversity,” which argues that diversity can be (come) a major positive for both political entities and private-sector organizations, if (f) diverse groups of people are properly and ethically led by competent leaders (Harrell and Stolle 2010; Payne, McDonald, and Hamm 2013).

Now, however, has come the alt right – which openly claims that diversity (particularly racial diversity) is almost always a negative for nation states and other societies (Derbyshire 2009; Taylor 2011; Day 2015; Bokhari and Yiannopolous 2016) because it increases specific “conflict” variables like crime and social unrest. In this paper, I conduct an empirical test of that thesis, examining the effect of several forms of diversity (i.e. racial, ethnic, economic), as well as eight other variables often discussed by the alt right and Managing Diversity camps, on three conflict-related dependent variables (murder rate, civil war/insurgency, international war-fighting) among a global data set of 171 nations. Overall, I find that diversity of assimilated racial groups within a state has surprisingly little effect on any form of conflict, but that (1) income inequality/economic diversity and (2) “tribal” diversity of self-identifying ethno-linguistic populations are respectively the biggest single predictors of (1) homicide rate and (2) insurgency/civil war within nation states. As a source of conflict, race matters far less than money and language.

I am obviously not the first author to write on this topic. As noted, the literature on the potentially negative effects of diversity is a large one, with a long history. Political scientists and sociologists who study the working world have pointed out that demographic heterogeneity – diversity - within working groups is associated with decreased job satisfaction and a worsening of intra-organizational communication among employees (Choi 2009, 603). Employees in diverse working groups exhibit a substantially higher possibility of turnover, and this is true to a statistically significant degree (2009, 603). More broadly, *all* heterogeneous groups seem to have more problems with conflict and communication failure than homogenous groups (Chatman & Flynn 2001; Ely 2004; Choi 2008). People often prefer to interact with those similar to them, in business or political settings, and find doing so easier and more rewarding than interacting with “others (Choi 2009, 606).” Individuals engaged in social or discursive activities in diverse groups may even feel more in danger or “less safe (2009, 606),” and trust each other less than would be the case in a homogenous setting.

Lack of social trust, in fact, is probably – at least since 2007 – the most widely cited negative effect of diversity on individual and group behavior. As was famously pointed out by Putnam during that year, levels of generalized trust appear to be lower among both minority and majority group members in diverse societies (Putnam 2007; Derbyshire 2009; Harrell and Stolle 2010). At least in the USA and at least in the short term, Putnam (2007) and others have

concluded that racial diversity reduces social capital, measured as norms of both trust and reciprocity (Harell and Stolle 2010, 236). In racially diverse areas of the United States, people – taken as a whole – trust one another less, cooperate less, and work together less often to resolve shared problems (2010, 236). Harrell and Stole do not come to this same conclusion, but, according to at least Putnam, even trust in an individual’s own racial and national in-group members decreases in sufficiently diverse settings (2007).

A large and relevant literature focuses specifically on diversity, generally conceptualized as ethnic diversity, as a cause of military conflict. Several scholars argue that ethnic heterogeneity can make intra-state conflict more likely because of strong hatreds and resentments neighbor groups often feel toward one another (Horowitz 200; Petersen 2002; Bakke and Wibbels 2006). Taking a slightly different tack, other authors contend that diversity causes fear-driven “security dilemmas” where ethnic groups resort to violence as a pre-emptive tactic, justified by fear of violence against their own population (Posen 1993; Cheney 2011). Not a few pessimistic academics and pundits claim that ethnic diversity correlates with conflict simply because many human beings are bigots, and prefer to live near those who look and act like them (Chavez 1997; Putnam 2007; Derbyshire 2009; Taylor 2011). Whatever the causal mechanism, there exists some empirical evidence that increasing ethnic heterogeneity produces conflict. Fearon and Laitin, in a landmark and wide-ranging piece, notably fail to find a strong connection between diversity on the one hand and insurgency and civil war on the other (2003). However, Blimes (2006), testing essentially the same thesis, finds a strong although indirect relationship between increasing diversity and the onset of civil war-fighting. There is also some evidence that ethnic diversity can lead to the rapid intensification of conflicts (Bloomfield and Moulton 1997; Horowitz 2000; Eck 2009). Intra-national conflicts in which rebels or other factions mobilize along ethnic/tribal lines are more likely to see “intensified violence” or extreme violence than conflicts fought out among parties for a reason unrelated to ethnic differences (Eck 2009, 369-370). All in all, within a multi-variate Cox model, “ethnically mobilized armed conflicts” were 92% more likely to intensify into full-blown wars than other armed conflicts, a finding Eck attributes to the ascriptive and easily adopted (by in-group members) nature of ethnicity (2009, 371).

However, there are also many empirically valid arguments *for* diversity made by the pro-diversity camp. The simplest of these is that the risks of increasing heterogeneity are often greatly over-stated, via – for example – the practice of describing local or regional results as globally reliable. Re-testing Putnam’s thesis, a panel of European scholars found that ethnic diversity had no effect on any measure of generalized trust among British respondents (Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Read, and Allum 2011). Heterogeneity did have some negative effect on one measure of specific strategic trust, but that effect was substantively tiny, and diversity appears to be a much less influential predictor of trust than income inequality and individual social connectedness (2011, 57). These authors specifically note that North American data on race relations is probably of limited generalizability, given this continent’s history of bloody racial conflict (58). They also make the point that many published studies, in this arena and elsewhere, focus excessively on the technical statistical significance of relationships (i.e., that between diversity and trust), as versus the actual substantive size and impact of those relationships (58). These authors do not stand alone in arguing that relationships between diversity and trust are not consistently strong and negative; multiple studies in fact find ethnic fragmentation to be either positively correlated or not correlated at all with generalized measures of trust (Leigh 2004; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006).

Perhaps more importantly, there is also little doubt that increasing diversity is statistically and substantively correlated with multiple actually positive outcomes. Across business and political settings, diversity within project teams can counteract group-think, “undermine entrenched patterns” of intentional or unintentional segregation, and “foster...new networks” capable of producing a superior final work product (Payne, McDonald, and Hamm 2013: 326). Put less formally, diversity – especially in situations where “task related” diversity of background skills is combined with demographic diversity – often increases a group’s “creativity and problem-solving capabilities (Choi 2009, 603),” thus improving organizational performance across a range of metrics (Ely 2004; Choi 2009). Diversity can even serve as a corrective to cronyism and corruption within organizations like bureaucracies, in that it provides a natural counter to the tendency of individuals sharing multiple overlapping social categories to establish social identity by showing favoritism to in-group members (Choi 2009), a practice which progresses at the extremes into destructive nepotism (see for example Horowitz 2000). While pointing out that increasing social heterogeneity has produced its share of wars and international interventions, Riggs also concedes the obvious: diverse Western modernity has also led directly to a flourishing of integration, high culture and “cosmopolitanism,” and to “cross cultural relations” which may be the best in history (1998, 269).

Perhaps the most logical position within the literature dealing with relations between diverse population groups comes from advocates of the “managed diversity” paradigm, who recognize both the advantages and the pitfalls of intra-national diversity. In their previously cited study of project teams, Payne, McDonald, and Hamm point out that a variety of leader-influenced factors, including peer as versus managerial discipline, work intensification, and feelings of job insecurity, affect the performance of diverse teams for better or worse (2013, 327-328). Similarly, effective management techniques have been found to greatly moderate dependent variables like the turnover intentionality of employees¹ in diverse settings. Effective management of diversity “positively moderated job satisfaction in racially heterogeneous groups” across the full universe of cases studied by Choi (2008, 2009). In the more specifically political sector, variables including federalism, effective and relatively honest politics, a “selective immigration system,” and managed multi-culturalism have all been found to correlate with social cohesion and with positive attitudes toward immigrants (Harrell and Stolle 2010, 236). Competently managed federal states do a generally effective job of controlling ethnic and regional squabbles within a universe of states including Brazil, China, Canada, Russia, Nigeria, and South Africa – chiefly by allowing nations to retain their territorial integrity while also giving powerful localized groups partial self-government (Brass 1974; Foner 1995; Martin 2001; Bakke and Wibbels 2006). Whether they prefer to use this particular label or not, advocates of Managing Diversity argue that diversity is neither inherently bad nor good, but rather what we make of it.

The alt right disagrees, loudly, that ethnic and in particular racial diversity can ever be positives for nation states and other organized entities. The alt right can be fairly described as a teenage American version of the European far Right (see, for example, Bokhari and Yiannopolous 2016): it is nationalist, xenophobic, monarchist, focused on traditional gender roles, advocates an idealized view of Western culture, and is quite racist by most standards used today. An unsympathetic critic, Seth Abramson of the Huffington Post, describes the movement as a bunch of bigots and rubes: “an undereducated, multi-faceted gaggle that hates Blacks, Jews,

¹ This is how economists and business scholars say: “desire to get a new job.”

liberals, globalization, and Hispanic and Muslim immigration (2016).” The British Broadcasting Corporation recently took a more nuanced approach, noting that opponents label the movement as anti-Semitic, misogynistic, and racist, but that its core principles seem to be opposition to political correctness, totally free speech, and “the right to offend (Cook 2016).” From within the alt-ranks, Bokhari and Yiannopolous define the alt-right constituency as white working and middle-class American activists, mostly male, who are pursuing a form of identity politics that “privileges the interests of *their* (own) demographic (2016).” They describe the movement as a sort of repository of secular heresies (“doubleplus ungood crimespeak”), including the so-called race realism of white nationalists like Jared Taylor, the human bio-diversity movement centered around serious study of race, the anti-feminist “men’s rights” movement, and the anti-war nationalist/isolationist movement (Bokhari and Yiannopolous 2016).²

Across essentially all of its demographics, the alt right’s core argument – and the argument which primarily brings the movement into the purview of modern political science – is that homogeneity is strongly preferable to diversity for nation states and other societies (Taylor 1993; Derbyshire 2009; Taylor 2011; Day 2015; Bokhari and Yiannopolous 2016). According to Bokhari and Yiannopolous, alt-righters believe that unitary culture, not “better food” or economic efficiency, “is the paramount value” which states should pursue above all else (2016). Crucially, many alt-righters go one step further, claiming that culture is indistinguishable from race (Bokhari and Yiannopolous 2016, McCall 2016), and that historically white Western-descent societies should oppose all immigration from non-Western societies (Derbyshire 2009). In a doomful book chapter called “Diversity: Nothing to Celebrate,” Derbyshire devotes 15 single-spaced pages to the idea of demographic diversity as a curse, arguing that racial and ethnic heterogeneity has caused problems ranging from brawls to genocidal wars in – among other places – Kenya, Belgium, Malaysia, Bolivia, Sweden, Tibet, and New South Wales (2009, 26-27). Ethnic and in particular racial diversity, he argues, brings with it dramatically increased conflict and should be avoided by sane societies at all costs (2009, 28).

This paper, a response to the recent media prominence of the alt right and the attempt of savants within the movement to enter the halls of serious scholarship (Taylor 2011; Day 2015; Abramson 2016; Bokhari and Yiannopolous 2016; Cook 2016; McConnell 2016) provides an empirical test of the claim that increasing diversity/heterogeneity correlates to a statistically and substantively significant degree with increases in three dependent variables representing conflict within and between societies. Using modern regression methods, primarily multivariate linear regression in STATA 13.0, I examine the effects of three diversity related variables and eight other independent variables on the dependent variables of intra-national homicide rate, insurgency/civil war, and international war-fighting among a global set of 171 nation states.

This paper makes three specific contributions to the discipline of political science. First, I add another quantitative and empirical study to a literature that includes more than a few good ones, but that is primarily theoretical or qualitative in nature (Kaplan 1993; Hacker 1995; Horowitz 2000; Peterson 2002). Second, I examine the effects of my independent variable set on two additional important measures of conflict (homicide rate and international war) in addition to the civil war/internal conflict metric that seems most commonly used in the discipline (see Fearon and Laitin 2003; Bakke and Wibbels 2006; Blimes 2006; Eck 2009). Finally and most

² Although I personally find some of it reprehensible, a fairly full collection of these Libertarian, far-Right, and even far-Left “alty” perspectives, most almost completely excluded from the mainstream media, can be found on the Unz Review website (<http://www.unz.com/>).

importantly, this paper specifically – and perhaps uniquely so far – tests the claims of the alt right, by (1) measuring the effect of specifically racial as versus ethnic and economic diversity on the dependent variables and in addition (2) testing whether Black and Muslim nations are in fact any more violent than the run of other nation states.

My primary starting hypothesis is that the effects of heterogeneity on conflict will vary. I expect both racial and ethnic diversity to have a significant positive influence on rates of homicide and civil war within states. However, contra the alt right, I expect the effect of ethnic/ethno-linguistic diversity on these dependent variables to be more substantively and statistically significant than the effect of racial diversity, and expect the effect of a third variable – income inequality or “economic diversity” - to be in turn much larger than the effect of racial or ethnic diversity. Also, given the well-documented negative effect of diversity on group-think and blind trust (Glodsmith 2004; Putnam 2007; Choi 2009; Harrell and Stolle 2010), I expect both racial and ethnic diversity to be significant *negative* predictors of international war-fighting. In addition to my primary diversity variables, I expect the standard predictors of national development (GDP, HDI, Dem.Index) to be significant negative predictors of all forms of conflict being studied, the Black or Islamic majority status of a nation state to be a significant negative predictor of all forms of conflict being studied, intra-national corruption (per the Corruption Perceptions Index) and population density to be significant positive predictors of all forms of conflict being studied, and the effect of population size on conflict to be mixed (negative as per homicide rate and civil war, positive as re international war fighting). Obviously, a finding that ethnic and in particular racial diversity are not significant positive predictors of the conflict variable set in properly run multivariate models, or that other factors such as GINI-based income inequality (“economic diversity”) have much greater positive effects on conflict, will challenge the alt-right paradigm and the anti-heterogeneity position overall. Findings in the opposite direction will support that paradigm, and that position.

2. Some Highly Educated Guesses: Primary Hypotheses and Underlying Theory

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the effect of diversity on conflict will be variant, with diversity increasing some forms of conflict but decreasing others. First, I do expect both ethno-linguistic diversity and racial diversity to be significant positive predictors of both homicide rate and insurgency/civil war. It is certainly true that effective national or enterprise leadership can mitigate most of the negative potential effects of population heterogeneity (Goldsmith 2004; Choi 2009; Harrell and Stolle 2010; Payne, McDonald, and Hamm 2013). But, truly inspired leadership, especially in the political arena, is rare in this fallen world (Frank 2005; Moser 2009). However, that said, I also expect – directly counter the alt right – that racial and ethnic diversity will have a significant negative effect on inter-national war-fighting on the part of nation states, given the tendency of increased heterogeneity to limit blind trust and group-think (Putnam 2007; Choi 2008; Payne, McDonald, and Hamm 2013), and also that income inequality will have a significantly greater effect on violence in and by states than will either measure of demographic diversity. I expect income inequality (GINI) to have a significant positive effect on all three measures of violence being studied.

Thus:

H1: Increasing racial diversity within a nation state will have a significant positive effect on homicide rate within that state and on civil war fighting within that state, but a significant negative effect on international war-fighting by that state.

H2: Increasing ethno-linguistic diversity within a nation state will have a significant positive effect on homicide rate within that state and on civil war fighting within that state, but a significant negative effect on international war-fighting by that state.

H3: Increasing income inequality (as per GINI) within a nation state will have a significant positive effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

In addition to my primary hypotheses concerning the set of diversity/demographic variables, I expect a “market basket” of positive indicators of national health (GDP, Human Development Index score, Democracy Index score) to have a statistically significant negative impact on all three forms of conflict being studied. These are general measures of state stability, and these or similar metrics have been found to correlate with similar positive outcomes in the large majority of published studies of international affairs and international conflict (Klare and Thomas 1994; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Blimes 2006; but see Chua 2002). I expect the dominant trend in the literature(s) to hold true in the context of this paper as well.

H4: Increasing purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP within a nation state will have a significant negative effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

H5: Increasing Human Development Index (HDI) score/ranking for a nation state will have a significant negative effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

H6: Increasing democratization within a nation state, as measured by Democracy Index score/ranking, will have a significant negative effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

For reasons essentially the opposite of those just given, I expect two other national health variables, corruption as per the Corruption Perceptions Index and population density, to be significant positive predictors of all three forms of violence being studied. Population density has been found, across a range of state types and time periods, to produce resource scarcities which correlate strongly with both internal conflict and external expansionism (Chua 2002; Diamond 2005). Corruption, of course, is perhaps the primary negative indicator of state health, and tends to predict negative outcomes and behaviors on the part of states much as increasing GDP correlates with positive ones (Klare & Thomas 1994; Horowitz 2000; Chua 2002; Mingst 2008). I will note here that I also expect national population itself to have mixed effects upon violent activity by and within states. Large and powerful nations are often more likely to fight wars than small and weak ones (List of Wars and Military Conflicts 1945-1989), but also less prone to internal strife caused by instability and state weakness (Horowitz 1985; Chua 2002; Diamond 2005). Thus I hypothesize:

H7: Increasing population density within a nation state will have a significant positive effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

H8: Increasing corruption within a nation state, as measured by Corruption Perceptions Index score/ranking, will have a significant positive effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

H9: Increasing population within a nation state will have a significant negative effect on homicide rate within that state and civil war fighting within that state, but a significant positive effect on international war-fighting by that state.

Finally, I hypothesize that two perhaps unexpected factors – Black and Islamic population majorities within individual nation states – will have a statistically significant negative impact on all three forms of violence being studied. This hypothesis is, to repeat, an intentional test of a claim made by the alt right and the anti-diversity movement. In addition to arguing that diversity of essentially every variety is sub-optimal for nation states, many alt right thinkers specifically argue that Blacks, Muslims, and to a lesser extent other non-Westerners are more violent, criminal, and warlike than Western whites (Taylor 1993; Derbyshire 2009; Taylor 2011; Day 2015; Rubenstein 2016). However, there seems to be little if any empirical evidence of this. Conflict, armed and otherwise, has long been universal across all human sub-populations (Horowitz 1985; Diamond 2005; Mingst 2008), and recent data indicates that primarily Caucasian regions of Eastern Europe and Northern Latin America are among the most violent in the world (World Bank Homicide Data 2013). Thus I hypothesize:

H10: The presence of a majority-Muslim population within a nation state will have a significant negative effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

H11: The presence of a majority Black/African-descent population within a nation state will have a significant negative effect on homicide rate within that state, civil war fighting within that state, and international war-fighting by that state.

In sum, I expect five variables to have significant negative impacts on all three of my conflict-related dependent variables (homicide rate, rate of civil war/insurgency, and international war-fighting). Those variables are: increasing democratization, increasing purchasing power parity (PPP) (GDP), Islamic majority within a nation state, and Black majority within a nation state. I expect three other variables to have significant positive effects on all three dependent variables. Those variables are: corruption, population density, and income inequality as measured by GINI. Finally, I expect three additional variables – ethnic diversity, racial diversity, and population size – to have mixed effects upon the dependent variable set. I hypothesize that racial diversity and ethnic diversity will be significant positive predictors of homicide rate and civil war, but significant negative predictors of international war-fighting, and that population size will be a significant negative predictor of homicide rate and civil war but a significant positive predictor of international war-fighting.

3. Getting Crunchy: An Appropriately Brief Note on Methods

The technique used to test the 11 hypotheses given above was multivariate linear regression, employing standard two-tailed tests and with the acceptable level of statistical significance set at .05. Overall, three regression models were run during the project. The

dependent variable in the first model was homicide rate in each of a global data set of 171 countries, taken from 2013 World Bank Homicide data and consisting of a composite mean average of 2011, 2012, and 2013 homicide rates. The dependent variable in the second model was the number of civil wars or major insurgencies recorded in each of the 171 nations between 1945 and 2016, taken from the Lists of Wars (i.e. List of Wars 1945-1989) sourced by historians and widely available through Internet platforms such as Britannica and Wikipedia. The dependent variable in the third model was the number of international wars engaged in by each of the 171 states since 1945, taken from the same source.

In order of entry, independent variables in each model included measures of democratization, corruption, Islamic population (coded Yes: No), ethnic diversity, racial diversity, Black majority population (Yes: No), overall population, population density, GDP, income inequality, and human development for each nation. My democratization measure was taken from the Democracy Index compiled by the international Economist Intelligence Unit (2015 Edition). My measure of intra-national corruption was taken from Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, again circa 2015. Data on ethnic diversity (coded as the number of self-identifying ethno-linguistic populations in each state), racial diversity (coded as 0:1, representing whether or not one or more minority "genetic" race(s) make up at least 10% of the Nation (X) population), the religious makeup of each nation's population, and the overall racial makeup of each nation's population was taken primarily from the CIA World Factbook (2016). Again, essentially identical versions of this data – I observed 96% congruence across sources – can be found using Britannica, Wikipedia, or any other competently maintained hard-copy or online encyclopedia.

The measure of PPP GDP used in the paper was taken from the most recent IMF Report for Selected Countries, the measure of income inequality came from 2015 World Bank: GINI Coefficient of Equalized Disposable Income data, and my human development metric came from the 2105 Human Development Report. Finally, my data on the population and population density of each nation came from the most recent census conducted by that state. For example: "Finland's population was 5,471,753 at the turn of the year 2016 (Statistics Finland)."

I will note that I do not employ any complex index to measure ethnic or racial diversity within the states I study. There are, of course, many excellent examples of such indices, perhaps most notably the Herfindahl Fractionalization Index (Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Read, and Allum 2011). Scholars have, for example, calculated intra-national diversity by squaring the percentage represented by each ethnic group within a state, adding up these percentages, and subtracting the cumulative sum of squared percentages from (1) (2011, 67). I do not do this. The strong form of the alt-right/anti-diversity argument is very simple: each addition of a new ethnic group to a previously non-diverse nation should increase violent conflict and other conflict there (Taylor 1993; Derbyshire 2009; Taylor 2011; Kersey 2012). Because a focus of this paper is testing that thesis, the measure of ethnic diversity I employ is simply an ordinal metric reflecting the number of distinct and sizable ethnic groups within each national population.³ My measure of racial diversity is even simpler: essentially it is whether a state is racially diverse or not. This measure makes a steel-man test of the alt-right claim that racial diversity almost invariably causes violence (Taylor 2011) possible. If that argument is indeed true, a sharply cut binary metric gives "the truth" the best possible mathematical chance of being revealed.

³ Like The World Factbook and Wikipedia, my measure of "sizable" is simply "greater than 1% of the full national population."

All regressions and other data analysis work for this paper took place within the STATA 13.0 suite.

4. The End of the Rainbow: Results and Discussion

Regression analysis confirmed some but not all of the starting hypotheses. First, and somewhat remarkably, racial diversity had no statistically significant effect on homicide rates or rates of civil war across the universe of nation-states. In my regression models, racial diversity was coded as a binary variable (Diverse/Not Diverse) designed to provide an absolute steel-man test of the thesis that diversity intensifies conflict. This variable did not reach standard levels of statistical significance in either of the first two models run. The racial diversity variable did approach significance (.063; $t=1.88$) in the Homicide Rates model, but was “significant” only at the (.946) level as a predictor in the Civil War and Insurgency model. Interestingly, racial diversity *was* a significant (if substantively unimpressive) predictor of international war-fighting, exactly the opposite of what I hypothesized given diversity’s generally negative impact on group-think and blind trust (Putnam 2007; Choi 2009; Strugis, Brunton-Smith, Read, and Allum 2011; Payne, McDonald, and Hamm 2013). However, my analysis of the data indicates that this outlier result was due almost entirely to the war-fighting proclivities of a few powerful states that happen to be quite diverse, notably the United States (19 international armed conflicts since 1945) and Great Britain (a quite respectable 10).

Table 1: Effects of Demographic and Other Variables on Homicide Rate⁴

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Income Inequality/”ED”	.496 (.13)***
Corruption Index (high to low)	-.201 (.079)**
Islamic Majority	-3.356(2.48)
Racially Diverse	4.275 (2.28)
Ethnic Diversity	.025 (.047)
Black Majority	-5.329 (3.43)
National Population	-.008 (.005)
Population Density	-.001 (.001)
PPP GDP	.045 (.071)
Democratization	1.197 (.733)
Human Development	-.012 (.014)
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R2 = .361	
Number of Final Observations = 127	

⁴For the “stargazers,” and as is usual, one * in these tables indicates significance at the (.05) level, two ** indicates significance at the (.01) level, and three *** indicates that a variable reached significance at the (.001) level. Coefficients have not been standardized in these models, because I mildly prefer the useful chaos of independent interpretation and comparison.

In contrast to those for the racial diversity metric, regression results involving the ethno-linguistic diversity variable were at least partly congruent with initial expectations. The ethnic diversity variable was not significantly predictive of homicide rate, but was the single largest predictor of insurgency and of intra-national civil war. In the Civil War model, this “tribal” diversity metric was significant at the (.002) level with a t-value of (3.21). The Beta coefficient for the variable was a mere (.02), but it is important to recall that the number of distinct ethnic groups in the countries within my sample ranged from a low of one to a high of 60 (for South Sudan). Going from the lowest to the highest level of (generally same-race) ethno-linguistic diversity measured in my sample, with all other variables stable at their median, would boost the number of civil/internal wars fought by a theoretical typical state by an astonishing twelve. Far more than race or racial diversity, “tribal” diversity seems to be a significant predictor of civil war-fighting within states. While (say) a 1% increase in an index measure of national diversity might not correlate significantly with increased chances of intra-national war (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 883-84), my results indicate that a simple ethnicity variable representing the number of large and unassimilated/linguistically distinct ethnic populations within a nation state is a strong statistical and substantive predictor of that state’s chances of fighting a civil war.

Also as predicted, GINI income equality was a significant positive predictor of homicide rate within states, with a far larger effect on this DV than racial diversity, ethnic diversity, or indeed any other variable. The GINI variable reached significance at the (.000) level (t=3.93), something rather rarely seen in 11-variable two-tailed tests, during the Homicide Rates model. Notably, Beta for this variable, a potentially 100-unit metric which ranged from 24 to 52 within only my sample, was (.496). This indicates that moving from the lowest to the highest level of income inequality recorded in my data set would increase the dependent variable of “murders” by 14 (28x .496) within a typical state. In contrast to its substantively and statistically significant effect on homicide rates, the GINI metric did not reach standard levels of significance as a predictor of civil war or international war-fighting – although it approached significance at the (.67) level in the Civil War model – meaning that those hypotheses technically failed. Nonetheless, the stand-alone relationship between inequality and murder remains striking. Simply put, inequality kills.

Table2: Effects of Demographic and Other Variables on Civil War/Insurgency

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Income Inequality/”ED”	-.027 (.015)
Corruption Index (high to low)	-.009 (.009)
Islamic Majority	.219 (.284)
Racially Diverse	.018 (.264)
Ethnic Diversity	.018 (.005)**
Black Majority	.076 (.401)

National Population	-0.001 (.001)
Population Density	-0.001 (.001)
PPP GDP	.003 (.008)
Democratization	-.038(.086)
Human Development	-.002 (.001)

R2 = .267
Number of Final Observations = 129

One additional variable, governmental and municipal corruption within states, reached significance in at least one model – as a significant positive predictor of murder rate (.012; $t = -2.55$). With all other variables set at their median, each step up the Corruption Perceptions Index from 0 to a theoretical 100⁵ would reduce the number of homicides within a typical state by (.20). As with the effect of income inequality on homicide, transiting up the ladder from maximal (a score of 3, in my sample) to median to low corruption (87) could literally be expected to save roughly 17 lives per 100,000 residents of a state. The effects of corruption on violence did not reach significance in either of the two other models run, but were in the same and expected direction in all three regressions. Like income inequality, corruption seems to affect at least one major measure of intra-state violence far more than does either racial or ethnic diversity.

Table3: Effects of Demographic and Other Variables on International War

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Income Inequality/"ED"	-0.061 (.054)
Corruption Index (high to low)	-0.010 (.030)
Islamic Majority	-0.549 (.946)
Racially Diverse	2.054 (.921)*
Ethnic Diversity	.032 (.093)
Black Majority	1.081(1.565)
National Population	.003 (.002)
Population Density	-0.001 (.001)
PPP GDP	.002 (.027)
Democratization	-.091(.281)
Human Development	.007 (.006)

R2 = .267
Number of Final Observations = 129

Results for the Black Majority and Islamic Majority variables also merit comment. Neither variable reached standard levels of significance as a negative predictor of homicide rate, civil war, or international war-fighting – as was hypothesized – but neither variable even

⁵ Higher is better, on the index.

approached significance as a positive predictor of those outcomes. The effects of both variables, taken together, were in the expected negative direction in 50% of cases, and the effect of Islamic majority status on violence was in the expected direction in two out of three cases. In the context of the Homicide Rates model, where both variables had a strong negative effect, the effect on in-state murder rate of transitioning from non-Islamic to Islamic majority status was (-3.36) homicides per 100,000 residents per year, and the effect of transitioning from non-Black to Black majority status was (-5.33) homicides per 100,000 residents per year. Neither of these findings was a statistical aberration; both approached significance at, respectively, the (.179) and (.123) levels. Simply put, in professional models adjusting for obvious control variables such as GDP, there is simply no evidence that non-Western Black and/or Islamic majority societies are significantly more violent than any other societies. As the raw data indicated, the most violent regions in the world, in terms of homicide and civil war, are Latin American states with majority-Caucasian or majority-indigenous populations (CIA World Factbook).

To break the Fourth Wall briefly, I was not displeased with my results. Obviously, not all of my hypotheses were confirmed. Coefficients for well over 50% (19) of my variables were in the expected direction, but my standard for hypothesis confirmation was statistical significance at the .05 level, and a failed hypothesis is a failed hypothesis. However, all three of the “diversity” variables that were the primary foci of this project treached statistical significance in at least one major model. Further, my results were strongly corrective of the alt right position and, to a lesser extent, the anti-diversity paradigm overall. Racial diversity had little to no effect on homicide rate or rate of civil war within the universe of states, despite the variable’s having been very specifically designed to have as robust an effect as possible. *Ethnic* diversity did have a huge effect on the frequency of civil war, and it frankly appears there may be something to the old conservative argument for the rapid linguistic and cultural assimilation of minorities (D’Souza 1995; Thernstrom 2003; Sowell 2005). However, it must be noted that the enormous majority of both ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict globally involves same-race groups speaking different languages, a complete refutation of the alt right argument that genetic race is the primary divider between peoples (Taylor 1993; Taylor 2011; McCall 2016). Further, the effect of income inequality on at least homicide rate was far larger and more statistically robust than the effect of any demographic diversity variable, and Black and Islamic-majority states displayed lower rates of homicide (both variables) and war-fighting (Islamic Majority) than other states. All in all, income inequality and government corruption appear to influence and predict conflict between individuals and groups far more than, for example, racial diversity does.

5. A Brief Conclusion, as Per the Formal Rules of Writing⁶

The debate about the impact of diversity on nation-states (and other societies) is a long-running one. Many scholars have noted that demographic diversity can bring with it issues such as workplace dis-satisfaction, civic unrest, and occasional serious ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985; Horowitz 2000; Chua 2002; Putnam 2007; Derbyshire 2009). However, others point out that the effects of diversity also include significant plus-side benefits like reduced group-think, reduced bigotry, increased cosmopolitanism, and improved final business and political product (Riggs 1998; Goldsmith 2004; Choi 2009; Payne, McDonald, and Hamm 2013). Perhaps the dominant paradigm in this field has been what some call “managing diversity,” whose advocates

⁶ To avoid the sin of self-plagiarism, I note here that this conclusion is roughly 98% identical to my abstract. I needed both to say the same thing, and no more.

argue that diversity can be a plus if steered toward the latter set of outcomes by competent political and business leaders (Goldsmith 2004; Harell and Stolle 2010; Meyer and Brysac 2011). Newly come to the field, the alt right disagrees!!! Authors writing within this bloc claim that – due in part to large perceived inequalities between cultures and races (Derbyshire 2009; Kersey 2012) – diversity almost always has a negative effect on specific variables measuring conflict (Taylor 2011).

This paper tests that claim. In it, I examine the effect of three measures of diversity, and of eight other independent variables, on three specific conflict-related dependent variables (homicide rate, civil war, international war-fighting). I hypothesize that income inequality/”economic diversity,” corruption, and population density will have a positive effect on all three forms of violence (i.e., increase them); that democratization, increasing GDP, increasing HDI, Black majority status, and Islamic majority status will have a negative effect on all three forms of violence (i.e., decrease them), and that racial diversity, ethnic diversity, and population size will have mixed and complex relationships with violence. Overall, my results support some of my starting hypotheses and strongly counter the alt-right/anti-diversity position. Black and Islamic majority societies are not more violent than other societies, and were in one model (Homicide Rates) notably less so. Racial diversity had essentially no effect on standard measures of homicide rate or civil war - the two primary measures it was hypothesized to effect - across a data universe of almost all nation states extant today, and income inequality had far more influence on at least homicide rate than any measure of demographic diversity. Ethnic diversity was a major predictor of civil war, but this potentially violence-producing form of diversity consisted, within my sample, almost entirely of groups within the *same* race polarized by lack of a shared language and culture. Overall, income inequality and governmental corruption had by far the most notable effects on any variable observed during this project.

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